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Abstract
This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry
of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice
problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From
one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their current position or to
choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness
criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a
fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred
acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic
strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by
tenure.
JEL classification numbers: C71; C78; D71; D78; I28
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1 Introduction
Since David Gale and Lloyd Shapley published their famous paper ”College admissions
and the stability of marriage” ([9]), many authors have studied assignment problems
in different contexts. Therefore, there is an extensive literature on allocation problems,
which, primarily considers static models. In contrast, there are many real-life applica-
tions where an assignment is made in a dynamic context. Some examples are on-campus
housing for college students, in which freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors
leave (Kurino [10]), kidney exchange of patients, in which each agent arrives with an
object to trade (U¨nver [14]), and firms with workers whose entry and exit lead to a reas-
signment of fixed resources (Bloch and Cantala [4]). In this paper, we study a dynamic
version of the well-known school choice model. Specifically, our model assigns school po-
sitions to overlapping generations of teachers. In each period, the central authority must
assign positions to teachers, taking into account each school’s priority ranking and the
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under the supervision of David Cantala within the CONACYT project 62188. I am also grateful to Jordi
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Brida, Juliana Xavier, Andre´s Sambarino and Rodrigo Velez for their comments and suggestions and
the seminar participants at E´cole Polytechnique, Economics Department at Universidad de la Repu´blica
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previous matching. From one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their
current position or to choose a preferred one (if available). Hence, the central authority
faces a dynamic allocation problem.
The original motivation for this paper is an assignment problem faced by the Mexican
Ministry of Public Education. In May 2008 the Mexican Federal Government, through
the Ministry of Public Education (SEP), signed an agreement with the National Educa-
tion Workers Union (SNTE) called ”The Alliance for the Quality of Education.1” Part
of the agreement was the creation of the National Contest for the Allocation of Teaching
Positions, a mechanism to assign teachers to teaching positions. As a consequence of this
agreement, teachers looking for a position in the public education system are required to
sit an exam. According to each teacher’s grade, the central authority ranks the teachers
and then assigns each a teaching position. Specifically, under the mechanism used by
the central authority, all open positions (that is, positions that are not already assigned)
are offered to the first teacher in the ranking. Once this first ranked teacher chooses a
school, remaining open positions are offered to the second teacher, and so on. Moreover,
any teacher that had been previously assigned a position may choose her current posi-
tion over the new positions that are offered to her. Thus, the central authority applies a
variant of the serial dictatorship mechanism, which takes into account that some agents
are initially assigned a position. In 2010, 145,983 teachers participated in the exam in
order to obtain a position.
Cantala [5] shows that the mechanism has some major flaws (see Appendix A.1 for
an illustrative example). In particular, a teacher can profit in a period after she enters
the market by misrepresenting her preferences. This implies that the mechanism is not
dynamic strategy-proof: it can be manipulated by teachers. Another flaw is that the
mechanism does not respect improvements made by teachers (Balinski and So¨nmez [3]),
that is, a teacher may increase her order in one school’s priority ranking, but be assigned
to a worse position. In this paper, we study the described problem within a more general
framework in order to cast some light on the resource allocation problem faced by SEP
1More information can be obtained from http://www.concursonacionalalianza.org
2
and SNTE.
A central concept in matching theory is stability: a matching is stable if there is
no unmatched teacher-school pair in which the teacher prefers another school to her
assignment and there is a teacher with lower priority assigned to that school. In school
choice models, this concept is usually referred to as the elimination of justified envy
(Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [2]) and embodies a notion of fairness. In addition to
elimination of justified envy, since we cannot assign a teacher to a less preferred school
than the one where she is teaching, we have to address the individual rationality condition.
We present a new fairness notion to accommodate these concepts.
In order to define a fair matching, we consider the claims that could exist in an
individual matching. Usually it is said that a teacher has a claim over a school if there
exists a school that she prefers over her assignment, and she has higher priority for it
than one of the assigned teachers. Note that a matching eliminates the justified envy if
and only if there is no claim in the matching. Moreover, we consider two kinds of claims.
If the teacher in the preferred school was not assigned to it in the previous period, we
say that it is a justified claim. On the contrary, if the teacher was assigned to the school
in the previous period, the claim is considered inappropriate. Observe that the last type
of claim is inappropriate due to the individual rationality restriction.
Finally, our fairness concept is as follows. We say that a matching is fair if:
- it is individually rational, non-wasteful (whenever a teacher prefers a school to her
own assignment, that school already has all its slots filled), and does not have justified
claims; and
- if there are inappropriate claims, the following must hold: there is no other matching
that satisfies the three previous properties and one inappropriate claim is solved without
creating a new one.
It is worth noting that SEP did not propose an explicit fairness concept and, also, that
the mechanism which is used by this central authority does not satisfy our definition of
fairness.
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In this context, we show that there exists a unique fair matching Pareto superior to
any other fair matching. In order to find it, a modified version of the deferred acceptance
algorithm of Gale and Shapley is introduced. Before applying the algorithm, we modify
each school’s priority ranking by moving teachers who had been assigned to the school in
the previous period to the top of the school’s priority ranking.2 With these new orders
we define the related market in which the deferred acceptance algorithm is applied.
A new dynamic version of strategy-proofness is introduced. The classic concept in
static matching problems only makes reference to the benefit in one period. Our notion
of strategy-proofness is dynamic in the sense that it involves not only the period when
the teacher enters the market but also all the later periods while she is in the market.
In our framework, teachers reveal their preferences in the period in which they enter
the market. In the following periods, they cannot modify the announced preferences.
We prove that if each school’s priority ranking is lexicographic by tenure, that is, if
teachers who were present in the previous period have priority over new teachers, then
the proposed mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof. Finally, it is shown under the same
condition that the mechanism also respects improvements made by teachers. Our concept
of respecting improvements involves not only the period when the teacher improves her
position in the ranking (like the classic notion), but also every following period.
As we mentioned, the literature on matching is mostly devoted to static match-
ing problems (see, for example, the excellent surveys of Roth and Sotomayor [12] and
So¨nmez and U¨nver [13]). Recently, some articles have presented assignment problems in
dynamic contexts. Kurino [10] is closest to our model. The author introduces a model of
house allocation with overlapping agents and analyzes the impact of orderings on Pareto
efficiency and strategy-proofness. In this sense, it is shown that under time-invariant
preferences, orders that favor existing tenants perform better, in terms of Pareto effi-
ciency and strategy-proofness, than those that favor newcomers. The author also studies
two dynamic mechanisms: a spot mechanism (with or without property right transfers)
and a future mechanism. Nevertheless, there are two main differences that distinguish
2A similar modification can be also found in Compte and Jehiel [6].
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our work from Kurino’s [10]. In the first place, we consider a fairness concept. We are
interested in fair matchings because each school’s priority ranking should be taken into
account. In the second place, our notion of strategy-proofness is defined in a dynamic
context and, in this sense, it takes into account all periods when the teacher is in the
market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the ingredients
of our model and the fairness concept. Section 3 is devoted to the existence of a solution
to our problem. In the next section, the proposed mechanism is introduced. Sections 5
and 6 analyze dynamics problems that arise in the model: dynamic strategy-proofness
and respecting improvements properties. In Section 7, we present the conclusions and
directions for future research.
2 Preliminary definitions
2.1 The Model
We consider the allocation of teaching positions to overlapping generations of teachers.
Time is discrete, starts at t = 1, and lasts forever. In each period, there is a set of schools
denoted by S. Each school s ∈ S has qs positions, and in each period, some of them
can already be assigned and the others are open. Additionally, we have the null school,
denoted by s0, which will be used to assign no school to teachers; we suppose that s0 is
not scarce. Denote by I t the set of teachers in period t. Note that I t changes over time
because in each period some teachers may exit the market while new teachers may enter.
We assume that |I t| ≤∑s∈S qs for all t.
Another ingredient of the model is a set of strict priority orders for all teachers,
denoted by >t ≡ {>ts}s∈S , which includes one different order for each school. When
teacher i has priority over j to choose a position in school s in period t, we write i >ts j.
We suppose that the relative order of teachers for each school does not change over time,
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that is, if i >ts j at some t, then i >
τ
s j for all τ such that i, j ∈ Iτ . 3
Each agent i ∈ I t has a complete and transitive preference relation over S ∪ {s0},
denoted by %i, and i is the induced strict preference relation over the same set. We
assume that no teacher prefers the null school (to be unmatched) to a real school (that is,
s i s0 for all s and i). Teachers reveal their preferences in the period in which they enter
the market. In the following periods, they cannot modify the announced preferences. Let
Λi be the set of strict preference relations of agent i. A preference profile at t is an element
of the Cartesian product of the set of preferences of all teachers present at t: Λ =
∏
i∈It
Λi;
we denote by  = (i)i∈It a preference profile at t.4
2.2 Matchings
A matching at t is an assignment of teachers to schools such that every agent is assigned
one school, and no school has more teachers assigned than slots, i.e., a function µt : I
t →
S ∪ {s0} such that
∣∣µ−1t (s)∣∣ ≤ qs for all s ∈ S. To indicate that agent i is matched to
school s in period t, we write µt(i) = s. Let Mt be the set of all matchings in period
t. A submatching is a matching with restricted domain, i.e., a function νt : J ⊂ I t →
S ∪ {s0}.
In the initial period, we have a set of teachers (denoted by I1E ⊂ I1), each of whom is
initially assigned to a school.5 The initial assignment can be considered as a submatching
in which each teacher in the set I1E is matched to her school. Hence, we describe the
initial submatching of period 1 as a function ν1 : I
1
E → S such that ν1(i) = s if and only if
i is initially matched to school s. For any period t ≥ 2, the initial submatching, denoted
by νt, is defined by the matching of the previous period; that is, given the matching of
3As it is common in this type of model, we assume that each school’s priority ranking is responsive
(see Roth and Sotomayor [12] for more details).
4Although formal notation would be t, to simplify it we will not use the subindex t. Then with 
we will refer to teacher’s preferences in the period under study.
5The subscript E is motivated by the fact that teachers in this group play the role of what is known
in the literature as existing tenants.
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the previous period µt−1 and sets S, I
t, we have νt = µt−1 | I tE with I tE = µ−1t−1(S)∩ I t.6
Clearly, it should be that
∣∣ν−1t (s)∣∣ ≤ qs for all s. Note that I t \ I tE is the set of teachers
who do not hold positions and are competing to hold one.
Given a matching µt−1, the sets S, I
t, the number of positions in each school {qs}s, the
set of strict orders>t= {>ts}s , and the preference profile at t, an overlapping teacher
placement problem is represented by the market M t =
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
. No-
tice that a market M t defines the initial submatching of period t, since νt = µt−1 | I tE and
I tE = µ
−1
t−1(S)∩ I t if t ≥ 2 (when t = 1 we have µ0 ≡ ν1). A solution of an overlapping
teacher placement problem is a matching.
A mechanism is a systematic procedure that assigns a matching for each problem;
that is, a function ϕ such that ϕ
(〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉) ∈ Mt, for any problem〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
. We will often abbreviate notation by omitting most of the
arguments and we will write ϕ (I t,) . We believe that this abuse does not confuse and
it makes the notation more manageable.
An economy is defined by the set of schools S and its slots {qs}s, an initial sub-
matching ν1, sequences of sets {I t}t , preference profiles {}t = {(i)i∈It}t, strict priority
orders of all teachers for each school {>t}t and finally, the mechanism, denoted by ϕ.
Observe that in the context of our model, the mechanism is included in the economy
because the matching in one period links this period with the one following. Specifi-
cally, the matching in one period determines the initial submatching for the next period.
Therefore, the mechanism plays the role of a transition rule between periods. Finally,
note that an economy defines the market in each period.
2.3 Fairness
The remainder of this section is devoted to the definition of fairness. We combine two
classic concepts present in the literature. On the one hand, since we have existing tenants
6Here µt−1 | ItE means the restriction of function µt−1 to the set ItE .
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in our model, we cannot assign a teacher to a less preferred school than the one where she
is teaching. Therefore, a fair matching should satisfy the individual rationality condition,
as defined in Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [1]. On the other hand, we must respect the
strict priority order of all teachers for each school. Hence, a fair matching should eliminate
justified envy, as defined by Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [2].
Consider any period t of our model. The information included in the market in that
period is given by M t = 〈S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, t, >t〉. Then, the initial submatching of
period t is defined by I tE = µ
−1
t−1(S)∩ I t and νt = µt−1 | I tE. Our goal is to define a fair
matching for the market M t. With that purpose, we first define the classic concepts of
individual rationality and non-wastefulness:
- A matching is individually rational if no teacher prefers the null school option or
the school she was initially assigned to her newly assigned school.
- A matching is non-wasteful if whenever a teacher prefers a school to her own assign-
ment, that school already has all its slots filled.
Next, we consider the claims that could exist after the matching. We say that a
teacher has a claim over a school if she prefers that school over her own assignment
and if a lower ranked teacher (in the priority order) has been assigned to that school.
Moreover, as we have explained, two kinds of claims can occur. The formal definitions
are the following.
Definition 1 A matching µt is individually rational if:
i) µt(i) %i s0, for all i ∈ I t,
ii) µt(i) %i νt(i), for all i ∈ I tE.
Definition 2 A matching µt is non-wasteful whenever a teacher i ∈ I t exists and a
school s, such that s i µt(i) then
∣∣µ−1t (s)∣∣ = qs.
Definition 3 Given a matching µt, teacher i has a justified claim over school s if:
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i) i prefers s to her assignment: s i µt(i), and
ii) there exists a teacher k assigned to s such that i has priority over teacher k in the
school’s ranking, and k was not assigned to s in the previous period; that is: ∃ k ∈ I t
such that µt(k) = s, i >
t
s k, and k /∈ ν−1t (s).
In the last definition, the criteria take into account that teacher i has justified envy
of the assignment of teacher k. Also note that if an agent in the preferred school was
assigned to it in the previous period, the claim is inappropriate or not justified, because
the agent has the right to continue in that school.
We say that a matching eliminates the justified claims if there is no justified
claim in the matching.
Definition 4 Given a matching µt , teacher i has an inappropriate claim over school
s if:
i) i prefers s to her assignment: s i µt(i), and
ii) there exists a teacher k assigned to s, such that i has priority over teacher k in
the school’s ranking, and k was assigned to s in the previous period; that is: ∃ k ∈ I t
such that µt(k) = s, i >
t
s k, and k ∈ ν−1t (s).
According to Definition 4, if the teacher in the preferred school was assigned to it in
the previous period, then she has the right to continue in that school even if she has a
lower ranking.
We say that a matching eliminates the inappropriate claims if there is no inap-
propriate claim in the matching.
Let Γ(µt) be the set of all inappropriate claims in matching µt, that is: Γ(µt) =
{(i, s) ∈ I t × S, such that i has an inappropriate claim over s in µt}.
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Definition 5 Matching µt is acceptable if it:
i) is individually rational,
ii) is non-wasteful, and
iii) eliminates the justified claims.
Let Ct ⊂Mt denote the set of all acceptable matchings.
Before presenting our concept of fairness, we explain our motivation with the following
example.
Example 1 Consider the following problem with S = {s1, s2, s3}, q1 = 2, q2 = q3 = 1,
I t = {i, j, k, l} , νt = {(i, s1), (j, s2)} , and the following preferences (from best to worst)
and orders: 
i j k l
s3 s2 s1 s2
s2 s1 s3 s1
s1 s3 s2 s3


>t1 >
t
2 >
t
3
l k k
k i j
i l i
j j l

The following matchings are acceptable:
µ1t =
 i j k l
s1 s2 s3 s1
 and µ2t =
 i j k l
s3 s2 s1 s1
 .
Note that Γ(µ2t ) = {(l, s2)}( Γ(µ1t ) = {(i, s2), (k, s1), (l, s2)} . Then, it is clear that
we should not define matching µ1t as fair because there is another acceptable matching
that solves two inappropriate claims without creating a new one.
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Our concept of fairness captures the idea illustrated in the last example: a matching
is fair if it is acceptable and, if it has inappropriate claims, there is no other acceptable
matching solving one of these claims without creating a new one.
Definition 6 A matching µt is fair:
i) if it is acceptable,
ii) there is no acceptable matching µ′t such that Γ(µ
′
t)( Γ(µt).
If there is an acceptable matching without inappropriate claims then, by the previous
definition, it is fair. Also notice that the concept of fairness does not imply a utilitarian
perspective. Indeed, we may have two fair matchings µt, µ
′
t, even if |Γ(µt)| < |Γ(µ′t)| .
It is easy to verify in the last example that there is no fair matching without inappro-
priate claims. Therefore, we cannot in general guarantee the existence of a fair matching
with Γ(µt) = φ. We can wonder, however, if it is possible to guarantee the existence of a
fair matching in any overlapping teacher placement problem. The next section is devoted
to that question.
3 Existence
In order to prove the existence of a fair matching, we introduce the concept of related
market. We want to apply the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm of Gale-Shapley to
obtain an individually rational matching. With that purpose, we modify each school’s
priority ranking. In each new priority ranking, we have two groups of teachers. The first
group in the new ranking is the set of teachers who had been assigned to the school in
the previous period, and the second is the remaining teachers. Within each group, the
order is defined by the original ranking >ts . With these new orders, we define the related
market in which the DA algorithm is applied. By Ergin [8] Proposition 1, we know that
the outcome of the DA algorithm adapts to the order structure: there is no teacher such
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that there is a school that she prefers over her assignment, and she has priority for it
over one of the assigned teachers. Next, we prove that the DA outcome is an acceptable
matching in the original market. Finally, since the set Ct is finite and not empty, we
choose one acceptable matching with the fewer number of claims; this is a fair matching.
Definition 7 Let M t =
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
be an overlapping teacher placement
problem. For each school s ∈ S with priority ranking >ts, let’s define the following order
of all teachers, denoted by Ots, as i, j ∈ I t and s ∈ S, if:
1. i, j ∈ ν−1t (s) the order is defined by >ts, that is i Ots j ⇔ i >ts j,
2. i ∈ ν−1t (s) and j /∈ ν−1t (s), then i Ots j, and
3. i, j ∈ I tν−1t (s) the order is defined by >ts, that is i Otsj ⇔ i >ts j.
Let Ot = {Ots}s∈S be the set of all such orders indexed by the school. Then, given a
market M t =
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
, the related market is 〈S, {qs}s , I t,, Ot〉 .7
Given the market M t =
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
and the related market 〈S, {qs}s , I t,, Ot〉 ,
we have all elements to apply the DA algorithm of Gale and Shapley [9] to the related
market. The algorithm works as follows:
Step 1. Each teacher proposes to her top choice. Each school s rejects all but the best
qs teachers among those teachers who proposed to it. Those that remain are “tentatively”
assigned one slot at school s.
In general,
Step k. Each teacher who is rejected in the last step proposes to her top choice
among those schools that has not yet rejected her. Each school s rejects all but the best
qs teachers among those teachers who have just proposed and those who were tentatively
assigned to it at the last step. Those who remain are “tentatively” assigned one slot at
school s.
7The idea of the related market in which position-specific priorities are modified can be also found
in Compte and Jehiel [6].
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The algorithm terminates when no teacher proposal is rejected. Each teacher is
assigned to her final tentative assignment.
When we apply the DA algorithm, since
∣∣ν−1t (s)∣∣ ≤ qs, if µt(k) 6= νt(k) for some
k ∈ ν−1t (s), then µt(k) k νt(k). That is, using orders Ot and applying the DA algorithm,
we obtain an individually rational matching.
Following Ergin [8], we present the following definition.
Definition 8 Given an overlapping teacher placement problem
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
and the related market 〈S, {qs}s , I t,, Ot〉 , we say that matching µt violates the pri-
ority of i for s, if there is a teacher h such that µt(h) = s, s i µt(i) and i Ots h. The
matching µt adapts to O
t if it does not violate any priorities.
The relation between a matching that adapts to Ot and an acceptable matching is
straightforward, as we prove in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 Given an overlapping teacher placement problem M t =
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
and the related market 〈S, {qs}s , I t,, Ot〉 , a matching is acceptable (relative to the mar-
ket M t) if and only if it adapts to Ot (regarding the related market) and it is non-wasteful.
Proof. (⇒) An acceptable matching is, by definition, non-wasteful. Then, suppose that
µt is acceptable but violates the priority of i for s. Then there is a teacher j such that
µt(j) = s, s i µt(i) and i Ots j. We have two cases: i >ts j or j >ts i. The latter
implies that i was originally assigned to school s, that is i ∈ ν−1t (s), but this violates the
individual rationality assumption. And the first implies that both i and j were originally
assigned to school s, since µt is an acceptable matching. But, once again, the latter
violates the individual rationality assumption for the assignment of i.
(⇐) Suppose that µt adapts to Ot and is non-wasteful, but not acceptable. Then we
have two cases: µt is not individually rational or there is a justified claim in µt. In the first
case, suppose that i is such that s = νt(i) i µt(i). Since matching µt is non-wasteful,
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we have teacher j, such that j /∈ ν−1t (s) and µt(j) = s. But then, i Ots j, and µt does not
adapt to Ot. If there is a justified claim in µt, we have two teachers i, j and a school s,
such that µt(j) = s i µt(i), i >ts j and j /∈ ν−1t (s). But then i Ots j and µt does not
adapt to Ot.
Therefore, the problem of finding an acceptable matching in our original framework
is equivalent to finding a matching that adapts to Ot and is non-wasteful in the related
market.
Proposition 1 Given an overlapping teacher placement problem
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
,
Ct is not empty.
Proof. Given the related market 〈S, {qs}s , I t,, Ot〉 , we apply the DA algorithm. It is
well-known (see Ergin [8] Proposition 1), that the outcome of the algorithm is a matching
that adapts to Ot. It is easy to show that the outcome is also non-wasteful. Then by
Lemma 1, we have an acceptable matching for our problem
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
.
Corollary 1 Given an overlapping teacher placement problem
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
,
a fair matching always exists.
Proof. We know that Ct is nonempty and finite. For each matching µt ∈ Ct , compute
|Γ(µt)| . Therefore, we have a finite set of real numbers; take µ′t ∈ Ct such that |Γ(µ′t)| ≤
|Γ(µt)| , for all µt ∈ Ct. Then, µ′t is a fair matching.
We know that in every problem, there is one fair matching. One easily finds examples
in which there are more than one fair matching.
It is a classic result of matching theory that the outcome of the DA algorithm satisfies
that every agent prefers his partner at this outcome at least as well as the partner of any
other acceptable matching. (It is said that the matching is agent-optimal in the subset
of acceptable matchings.) Then we know that DA outcome is Pareto superior to any
other fair matching. If we proved that the result of the DA algorithm is a fair matching,
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we would prove that it is also the best fair matching, because it is a well-known result
that if preferences are strict, there is only one acceptable matching Pareto superior to
any other acceptable matching.8 This is the purpose of the following results.
Lemma 2 Given an overlapping teacher placement problem 〈S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,
, >t〉, consider the outcome of the DA algorithm, denoted by µGSt , when
it is applied to the related market 〈S, {qs}s , I t, , Ot〉. Then µGSt is a fair
matching.
(See Appendix for a proof).
Since preferences are strict, we have the following characterization theorem.
Proposition 2 Given an overlapping teacher placement problem 〈S, {qs}s , I t,
µt−1, , >t〉, a fair matching µt is Pareto superior to any other fair matching
if and only if it is the outcome of the DA algorithm (applied to the related
market).
4 A Mechanism
As we have defined, an economy includes a mechanism, because the dynamic of our
problem is defined by the relation between the matching of one period and the initial
assignment of the following one. We know that the DA mechanism is the best one, in the
sense that its outcome is fair and Pareto superior to any other fair matching. Then it is
the searched mechanism, but it must be applied to the related market defined in Section
3.
Definition 9 The teacher proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is the mech-
anism that assigns to each overlapping teacher placement problem
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
the outcome of the DA algorithm when it is applied to the related market 〈S, {qs}s , I t, , Ot〉 .
8See Ergin [8] Proposition 1, and Balinski and So¨nmez [3] Theorem 2.
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Definition 10 The teacher proposing deferred acceptance economy is an econ-
omy in which the mechanism is the teacher proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.
Definition 11 A mechanism is fair if it always selects a fair matching. And an
economy is fair if the used mechanism is fair.
The previous sections show that if we restrict our attention to fair economies, the
best economy in terms of efficiency is the teacher proposing deferred acceptance economy.
And we also know that essentially it is the unique fair economy with that property (other
economies use a mechanism that yields the same result). Hence, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 A mechanism is fair and Pareto superior to any other fair
mechanism if and only if it is the teacher proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism.
In the next two sections, we study dynamic properties of the proposed mechanism.
5 Dynamic Strategy-Proofness
Suppose that a new teacher enters the market to compete for a position at time t0. A
natural question is whether this new teacher can ever benefit by unilaterally misrepre-
senting her preferences. If the DA mechanism is used, it is a well-known result that she
cannot benefit in period t0 by manipulating her preferences (Roth [11] and Dubins and
Freedman [7]). But, what can be said about the following periods? Can a teacher benefit,
in the following periods, by sacrificing her school in period t0? After some definitions,
we study this issue.
Notation 1 We denote by ϕ [I t,] (i) the school assigned in period t to teacher i under
the mechanism ϕ.
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Definition 12 Suppose an economy S, {qs}s , ν1, {I t}t , {(i)i∈It}t , {>t}t , ϕ and a teacher
i who enters the market at time t0. We say that the mechanism ϕ is dynamic strategy-
proof if teacher i cannot ever benefit by unilaterally misrepresenting her preferences, that
is: ϕ is dynamic strategy-proof if ϕ[I t,−i,i] (i) %i ϕ[I t,−i,′i](i) for all i, −i, ′i
and for all t ≥ t0 such that i ∈ I t, where −i are the preferences of teachers in the set
I t {i} .
Remark 1 The classic concept in static matching problems only makes reference to the
benefit in one period. In our framework, the concept involves not only the period when
the teacher enters the market (and reveals her preferences) but also all the later periods
while she is in the market.
It is interesting to note that a mechanism can be strategy-proof (with the usual static
definition) but not dynamic strategy-proof. Appendix A.1 shows a mechanism with this
property.
As we remarked in the beginning of this section, when the teacher proposing deferred
acceptance mechanism is used in static problems, it is strategy proof. So, we can wonder
if this property is also verified by the mechanism in a dynamic context. In the next
example, we prove that in our dynamic model, the mechanism can be manipulated by
teachers.
Example 2 Consider the following problem:
I tE = {j, k} ⊂ I t = {i, j, k} ,
S = {s1, s2, s3} , qi = 1, i = 1, 2, 3, νt = {(j, s2), (k, s3)} , and
the following teacher preferences (from best to worst) and orders:
i j k
s2 s3 s2
s3 s2 s3
s1 s1 s1


>t1 >
t
2 >
t
3
i j k
j k i
k i j

17
Then the outcome of the teacher proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is:
µt =
 i j k
s1 s2 s3

For the next period assume: I t+1 = {i, j, l},

l
s2
s3
s1


>t+11 >
t+1
2 >
t+1
3
i j l
j i i
l l j

The matching in this period is:
µt+1 =
 i j l
s1 s2 s3

Suppose that instead of her true preferences, teacher i reveals the following preferences:
′i= (s2, s1, s3). Then the matching generated in each period is:
µ′t =
 i j k
s1 s3 s2
 µ′t+1 =
 i j l
s2 s3 s1

Since µ′t+1(i) = s2 i µt+1(i) = s1, teacher i can benefit by unilaterally misrepresenting
her preferences. 
Let’s examine the last example more closely. By revealing other preferences, teacher
i can manipulate the initial submatching of period t+ 1. When she reveals ′i, teacher j
is assigned in period t to school s3. Then j has priority over the new teacher l to school
s3 even when she is lower ranked than the new teacher. If i reveals her true preferences,
new teacher l has priority over j to school s3, then j is rejected from that school and she
proposes to s2, causing the rejection of i from that school. It is easy to see that this case
is also possible when there is a unique priority order of all teachers, that is: >ts= >
t for all
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s and t. However, as we will prove in the next theorem, if in each school’s priority ranking
teachers that were present in the previous period have priority over new teachers, then
the teacher proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof. First
we define this property and then we present our positive result.
Definition 13 A set of orders {>ts}s∈S is lexicographic by tenure if for all teachers i, j ∈
I t, whenever i ∈ I tE, and j /∈ I tE then i >ts j for all school s ∈ S.
In an overlapping teacher placement problem
〈
S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >t
〉
in which the
set of orders >t= {>ts}s∈S is lexicographic by tenure, each order in the related market
consists of three groups of teachers. The first group in the order is the set of teachers
who were assigned to the school; then we have the set of teachers who were assigned to
another school in the previous period. Finally, we have the new teachers. Within each
group, the order is defined by the original priority ranking >ts .
Definition 14 An economy is dynamic strategy-proof if the used mechanism is
dynamic strategy-proof.
Theorem 2 Let S, {qs}s , ν1, {I t}t , {(i)i∈It}t , {>t}t , ϕ be the teacher proposing
deferred acceptance economy. If in each t the set of orders {>ts}s∈S is
lexicographic by tenure, then the economy is dynamic strategy-proof.
(See Appendix for a proof).
6 Respecting Improvements
In this section, we study another important property of mechanisms, namely, respecting
improvements. We say that a mechanism does not respect improvements made by teach-
ers if a teacher may increase her place in one school’s priority ranking, everything else
remains unchanged, and yet she is punished with a less preferred assignment (Balinski
and So¨mnez [3]). In the introduction, we presented a mechanism that does not respect
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improvements. In this section, we study whether or not the teacher proposing deferred
acceptance mechanism has this failure.
Definition 15 An overlapping teacher placement problem 〈S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1,, >˜ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉
is an improvement for teacher i over another problem
〈
S, {qs}i , I t, µt−1,, >ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′
〉
,
if i >ts′ j implies that i >˜
t
s′ j , and for all teachers k, h different from i, we have that
h>˜ts′k ⇔ h >ts′ k.
According to Definition 15, an improvement for a teacher is basically the original
placement problem with the only difference being that the teacher is possibly in a higher
place in some school’s priority ranking.
Definition 16 A mechanism respects improvements if for any teacher i and 〈 S,
{qs}s , I t, µt−1, , >˜ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉 an improvement for that teacher over another problem
〈S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, , >ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉, the position assigned by the mechanism to teacher
i in each period since the improvement (that is, in all periods τ ≥ t) is, for teacher i, at
least as good as the position assigned in each period beginning with the problem 〈S, {qs}s ,
I t, µt−1, , >ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉. That is, let µt denote the matching that selects the mechanism
in the problem with >ts′ and µ˜t the matching that selects in the problem with >˜
t
s′ . Then
the mechanism respects improvements if µ˜τ (i) %i µτ (i) for all τ ≥ t.
Remark 2 The comment in Remark 1 also applies to this definition. Our concept of
respecting improvements involves not only the period when the teacher improves her place
in the priority ranking (as in the classic notion), but also every following period while
she is in the market.
It is worth noting that there is no relation between the properties of respecting im-
provements and dynamic strategy-proofness. Consider the static problem; on the one
hand, the mechanism described in the introduction is strategy-proof but does not re-
spect improvements made by teachers (see Appendix A.1). On the other hand, it is
straightforward to find a mechanism that respects improvements but is not strategy-
proof. Now consider the dynamic problem and a mechanism that is both strategy-proof
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and respects improvements (in the static problem). We can wonder if there is any re-
lation between both properties in the dynamic problem. One easily finds examples of
mechanisms that satisfy only one of these properties. Hence, there is no relation between
these two properties, neither in the static problem nor in the dynamic one.
In the next example, we show that the same problem of the previous section also
appears with this property.
Example 3 Consider the same problem of Example 2 and suppose another problem with
the same elements, but in which the order of school s3 is: >¯
t
3 = (k, j, i). Denote by M
t
and M¯ t the problem of Example 4 and its modification, respectively. Then, problem M t
represents an improvement for teacher i over M¯ t. The outcome of the teacher proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism for each problem is (µt corresponds to the problem M
t
and µ¯t to M¯
t):
µt =
 i j k
s1 s2 s3
 µ¯t =
 i j l
s1 s3 s2

In the next period, we have >¯t+13 = (l, j, i) and the following matchings:
µt+1 =
 i j k
s1 s2 s3
 µ¯t+1 =
 i j l
s2 s3 s1

Finally, we have that µ¯t+1(i) i µt+1(i). Then, although teacher i improves her position
in the ranking of school s3, she is assigned in period t+ 1 to a less preferred school. 
As we will prove in the next theorem, if the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure,
the mechanism respects improvements.
Definition 17 An economy respects improvements if the mechanism used respects
improvements.
Theorem 3 Consider a teacher i and 〈 S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, , >˜ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉, an
improvement for that teacher over another problem 〈S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, , >ts′ ,
{>ts}s 6=s′〉. Denote by µ˜t and µt matchings selected by the teacher proposing
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deferred acceptance mechanism in each problem. Then µ˜t(i) %i µt(i). More-
over, if in each period τ ≥ t the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure, then
the teacher proposing deferred acceptance economy respects improvements.
(See Appendix for a proof).
7 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a brief discussion about efficiency. A matching µt is Pareto efficient
(or simply efficient) if there is no other matching that makes all teachers present at t
weakly better off and at least one teacher strictly better off. A mechanism is efficient if,
for any preference profile, it always selects an efficient matching. Then, one can wonder
if the proposed mechanism in our model is efficient. We use a result from Ergin [8] to
address this question: a cycle for a given priority structure Ot is constituted of distinct
schools s, s′ ∈ S and teachers i, j, k ∈ I t, such that i Ots j Ots k Ots′ i. By Theorem 1 of
Ergin [8], we know that the DA mechanism is Pareto efficient if and only if the priority
structure is acyclical (that is, the priority structure has no cycle). In our problem, under
the assumption that in each period there are at least three teachers, each of whom was
assigned to a different school in the previous period, the priority structure of the related
market Ot always has at least one cycle. Let i, j, k ∈ I tE with νt(i) = s, νt(j) = s′ and
νt(k) = s
′′, then i Ots j O
t
s k O
t
s′′ i or i O
t
s k O
t
s j O
t
s′ i, but in both cases there is a cycle.
Finally, applying the mentioned theorem, we know that the proposed mechanism is not
Pareto efficient. However, it is important to stress that the outcome of DA mechanism is
Pareto efficient in the subset of acceptable matchings. Moreover, since the DA outcome
is the unique fair matching that is Pareto superior to any other fair matching, we have
the following result: if in each period there are at least three teachers, each of whom
was assigned to a different school in a previous period, there is no fair and efficient
mechanism.
The last result stresses the classic tradeoff between efficiency and fairness (see Ab-
dulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [2]). Roughly speaking, one has to choose between one of these
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properties. In our model, we consider fairness as more important since once an agent is
assigned to a school, she cannot be changed unless she is assigned to a preferred school.
In this sense a violation of the fairness condition has consequences in future periods.
There are other mechanisms that select Pareto efficient matchings. Gale’s top trading
cycles mechanism (described in Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1]) is one of them.
In this paper, we have developed a new framework to model a dynamic school choice
problem with overlapping generations of agents. In each period, the central authority
must assign teachers to teaching positions. Two elements must be considered in the
assignments: the school’s priority rankings and previous assignments. From one period
to another, teachers are allowed either to retain their current position, or to choose a
preferred one (if available). Hence, the central authority faces a dynamic allocation
problem.
The dynamic of our model is defined by the mechanism. The matching in one period
links this period with the following one because it determines the initial submatching
for the next period. In this framework, we introduced a new fairness concept that is
very natural in our context. We have proved that a fair matching always exists and
that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of
Gale and Shapley. In particular, the algorithm is applied to a related market in which
each school’s priority ranking is modified to obtain an individually rational matching. In
relation to the properties of the proposed mechanism, we proved that if the set of orders
is lexicographic by tenure, it is dynamic strategy-proof and respects improvements made
by teachers.
8 Appendix
A.1 The weaknesses of SEP mechanism.
Suppose there are four schools S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} , each one with only one slot and
four teachers present in the market at time t : I t = {i, j, k, l} . Assume that teachers
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k and l were assigned in a previous period to schools s3 and s4, respectively. Teacher
preferences (from best to worst) and the ranking are (where h are preferences of teacher
h): 
i j k l
s3 s4 s1 s2
s1 s2 s3 s3
s2 s3 s2 s4
s4 s1 s4 s1


>t
i
k
l
j

That is, teacher i ’s most preferred school is s3, her second choice is s1, and so on. We
also have that the first teacher in the ranking is i, the second k, the third l, and the last
j. Suppose that we use the mechanism described in the introduction, then the matching
in this market is (the school below each teacher is her assigned school):
µt =
 i j k l
s1 s4 s3 s2

Assume that in the next period, teachers k and l exit the market and two new teachers
enter. Then we have I t+1 = {i, j,m, n} , >t+1= (m, i, n, j). The preferences of new teach-
ers are m= (s1, s3, s4, s2) and n= (s2, s4, s1, s3). Then, the outcome of the mechanism
is:
µt+1 =
 i j m n
s1 s4 s3 s2

Next we will show how a teacher can benefit by manipulating her preferences. Suppose
that instead of her true preferences, teacher i reveals the following preferences: ′i=
(s3, s2, s1, s4). Hence, the outcome of the mechanism in each period is:
µ′t =
 i j k l
s2 s4 s1 s3
 and µ′t+1 =
 i j m n
s3 s4 s1 s2

Note that µ′t+1(i) i µt+1(i), and then teacher i benefits in period t+ 1 by misrepresent-
ing her preferences. Hence, the mechanism is not dynamic strategy-proof. The second
flaw we will illustrate is that the mechanism does not respect improvements made by
teachers. Suppose that teacher i, instead of being the first in the ranking >t, has a worse
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performance and she is the second in the ranking. Specifically, assume that at period t
the ranking of teachers is: >˜t = (k, i, l, j). Then the outcome of the mechanism is:
µ˜t =
 i j k l
s3 s4 s1 s2

Therefore, it is better for teacher i to have a lower order in the ranking, because if she
increases her position in the ‘priority order,’ like in >t, she will be punished with a worse
position.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If Γ(µGSt ) = ∅, the proof is complete. Otherwise, we already know that µGSt is
acceptable. Suppose that it is not fair; then, we have another acceptable matching µt,
such that Γ(µt)( Γ(µGSt ). Since µGSt is Pareto superior to µt : µGSt (i) %i µt(i) ∀i and there
is an agent h such that µGSt (h) h µt(h). We claim that in this case Γ(µGSt ) ⊂ Γ(µt), but
this contradicts the last relation. Suppose there is a pair (i, s) ∈ I t×S, such that (i, s) ∈
Γ(µGSt ) but (i, s) /∈ Γ(µt). Then we have a teacher j, such that µGSt (j) = s i µGSt (i) = s′,
i >ts j and j ∈ ν−1t (s). As (i, s) /∈ Γ(µt), we have two cases: µt(i) %i s or j /∈ µ−1t (s). The
first case implies µt(i) %i s i µGSt (i), but it is not possible since µGSt is Pareto superior
to all acceptable matchings. In the second case, it must be µGSt (j) = s = νt(j) j µt(j),
but then µt is not individually rational. Finally, we prove that Γ(µ
GS
t ) ⊂ Γ(µt).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. For the following proofs, teachers are denoted by i1, i2, ... and schools by s1, s2, ....
In the first period, observe that for strategy-proofness, only agent preferences mat-
ter. Then, since in the definition of the related market we do not modify teacher prefer-
ences, strategy-proofness in the period when a teacher enters is a direct consequence of
Roth [11] and Dubins and Freedman [7] ’s results. We shall prove that a teacher cannot
benefit by unilaterally misrepresenting her preferences in the following periods while she
is in the market.
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For the second period, suppose teacher i1 with preferencesi1 . We have ϕ(S, {qs}s ,
I t, µt−1, >
t, −i1 , i1) (i1) = µt(i1), and when i1 misrepresents her preferences stating
′i1 , she obtains ϕ(S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, >t, −i1 , ′i1) (i1) = µ′t(i1). By Roth [11] we know
that µt(i1) %i1 µ′t(i1) and, in particular, if µt(i1) 6= µ′t(i1) then µt(i1) i1 µ′t(i1). Each
matching at t generates a different initial submatching for the next period. Denote by
νt+1 and ν
′
t+1 the initial submatchings define by µt and µ
′
t, respectively. When mechanism
ϕ is applied to the markets 〈S, {qs}s , I t+1, µt, >t+1, −i1 , i1〉 and 〈S, {qs}s , I t+1, µ′t,
>t+1, −i1 , ′i1〉, matchings µt+1 and µ′t+1 are generated. We shall prove that µt+1(i1) %i1
µ′t+1(i1).
If νt+1 = ν
′
t+1, the argument used in the first period can be applied to prove µt+1(i1) %i1
µ′t+1(i1). Then assume νt+1 6= ν ′t+1. The following lemma will be useful for the proof
Lemma 3 Consider markets M t = 〈S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, >t, −i1 , i1〉 and Mˆ t = 〈S,
{qs}s , I t, µt−1, >t, −i1 , ′i1〉 defined before, and the set I tE = µ−1t−1(S)∩ I t. Denote by
µt and µ
′
t the outcome of the teacher proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in each
market M t and Mˆ t, respectively. Then every teacher j ∈ I tE satisfies that µ′t(j) = µt(j).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, there is a teacher j1 ∈ I tE, such that µ′t(j1) 6= µt(j1);
assume, without loss of generality, µ′t(j1) ≡ s1 j1 µt(j1). Then, by non-wastefulness,
there is another teacher j2 ∈ I t, such that µt(j2) = s1 and µ′t(j2) 6= s1. Since µt(j2) j1
µt(j1), we know that j2O
t
s1
j1 and in particular j2 ∈ I tE. Therefore, as µ′t(j2) 6= s1, we have
µ′t(j2) ≡ s2 j2 µt(j2) (otherwise µ′t does not adapt to Ot). Then, there is another teacher
j3 ∈ I t, such that µt(j3) = s2 and µ′t(j3) 6= s2. Since µt(j3) j2 µt(j2), we know that
j3O
t
s2
j2 and in particular j3 ∈ I tE. Therefore, as µ′t(j3) 6= s2 we have µ′t(j3) ≡ s3 j3 µt(j3)
(otherwise µ′t does not adapt to O
t).
Continuing in this fashion, we construct a cycle (j1, j2, ..., jn) such that µ
′
t(j1) = µt(j2),
µ′t(j2) = µt(j3), ..., µ
′
t(jn) = µt(j1) and µ
′
t(h) h µt(h) for all agents h in the cycle. Next,
from matching µt, implement the cycle and let µ
′′
t be this new matching, in which the
rest of the teachers keep their position (µ′′t (a) = µt(a) for all teachers that are not in
the cycle). Then, it should be that µ′′t does not adapt to O
t, otherwise µ′′t is a matching
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that adapts to Ot and is Pareto superior to µt. Then, there is a teacher k ∈ I t such that
µ′′t (jm) k µ′′t (k) for some m = 1, ..., n and k Otµ′′t (jm) jm. Note that k ∈ I tE. But since
µ′t(jm) = µ
′′
t (jm) and µ
′
t adapts to O
t, then µ′t(k) k µ′′t (jm) k µ′′t (k) = µt(k). Then,
we can construct another cycle, implement it, and repeat the procedure until we find a
matching that adapts to Ot and is Pareto superior to µt; finally, we have a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5 (continued).
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that µ′t+1(i1) i1 µt+1(i1) and µ′t+1(i1) = s1.
Observe that νt+1(i1) 6= s1 and, since νt+1(i1) %i1 ν ′t+1(i1), we have ν ′t+1(i1) 6= s1 (because
in the contrary s1 i1 µt+1(i1) %i1 νt+1(i1) %i1 ν ′t+1(i1) = s1). By non-wastefulness, we
know that
∣∣µ−1t+1(s1)∣∣ = qs1 and since µ′t+1(i1) = s1, there is a teacher i2 ∈ I t+1, such that
µt+1(i2) = s1 and µ
′
t+1(i2) 6= s1. We claim that µ′t+1(i2) %i2 s1. Suppose s1 i2 µ′t+1(i2).
Since µ′t+1(i1) = s1, it must be i1O˜
t+1
s1
i2, and since s1 = µt+1(i2) i1 µt+1(i1), i2 Ot+1s1 i1
(note that this also implies i2 ∈ I t+1E ).9
We have two cases: i1 >
t+1
s1
i2 (and then νt+1(i2) = s1 because i1 ∈ I t+1E ) or i2 >t+1s1 i1.
In the last case, since ν ′t+1(i1) 6= s1, we have that i2 /∈ I tE (that is, i2 is a new teacher),
which contradicts the fact that i2 ∈ I t+1E . In the first case, we claim (1) ν ′t+1(i2) 6= s1
and (2) i2 ∈ I tE. To prove the first claim, if ν ′t+1(i2) = s1, we have s1 i2 µ′t+1(i2) %i2
ν ′t+1(i2) = s1. For the second claim, we know that s1 = νt+1(i2) = µt(i2) = µ
′
t+1(i1) i1
µt+1(i1) %i1 νt+1(i1) = µt(i1) and then i2 Ots1 i1. But as i1 >ts1 i2, then it must be i2 ∈ I tE.
Finally, we found that i2 ∈ I tE and s1 = νt+1(i2) = µt(i2) 6= ν ′t+1(i2) = µ′t(i2). But, due
to the last lemma, this a contradiction. Then µ′t+1(i2) %i2 µt+1(i2) = s1 and because of
µ′t+1(i2) 6= s1, we have µ′t+1(i2) ≡ s2 i2 µt+1(i2) = s1 and i2 ∈ I t+1E .
For i2 we have a similar situation as for i1 : i2 is proposed to s2 in the problem with
νt+1 and she is rejected. By non-wastefulness, we know that
∣∣µ−1t+1(s2)∣∣ = qs2 and due to
µ′t+1(i2) = s2, there is a teacher i3 such that µt+1(i3) = s2 and µ
′
t+1(i3) 6= s2. As before, we
9Here O˜t+1s1 denotes the strict priority order in the related market of all teachers for school s1 in the
problem with ν′t+1.
27
claim that µ′t+1(i3) %i3 s2. Suppose, to the contrary, s2 i3 µ′t+1(i3). Since µ′t+1(i2) = s2,
it must be i2 O˜
t+1
s2
i3 and, since µt+1(i3) i2 µt+1(i2), i3 Ot+1s2 i2 (notice that this also
implies i3 ∈ I t+1E ). We have two cases to study: i2 >t+1s2 i3 (and then νt+1(i3) = s2 because
i2 ∈ I t+1E ) or i3 >t+1s2 i2 (and then ν ′t+1(i2) = s2).
In the first case, we claim: (1) ν ′t+1(i3) 6= s2 and (2) i3 ∈ I tE. If ν ′t+1(i3) = s2, we have
s2 i3 µ′t+1(i3) %i3 ν ′t+1(i3) = s2. We also know that s2 = νt+1(i3) = µt(i3) = µ′t+1(i2) i2
µt+1(i2) %i2 νt+1(i2) = µt(i2) and then i3 Ots2 i2. But as i2 >ts2 i3, then it must be i3 ∈ I tE.
Finally, we found that i3 ∈ I tE and s2 = νt+1(i3) = µt(i3) 6= ν ′t+1(i3) = µ′t(i3). But,
beacuse of the last lemma, this is a contradiction.
In the second case, we claim (1) νt+1(i2) 6= s2 and (2) i2 ∈ I tE. To prove the first
claim, note that if νt+1(i2) = s2, we have s2 i2 µt+1(i2) %i2 νt+1(i2) = s2. For the
second claim, we know that s2 = µ
′
t(i2) = µt+1(i3) i3 µ′t+1(i3) %i1 ν ′t+1(i3) = µ′t(i3)
and then i2 O
t
s2
i3. But as i3 >
t
s2
i2, then it must be i2 ∈ I tE. Observe that i2 ∈ I tE and
s2 = ν
′
t+1(i2) = µ
′
t(i2) 6= νt+1(i2) = µt(i2), which is a contradiction to the last lemma.
Thus, µ′t+1(i3) %i3 µt+1(i3) = s2 and due to µ′t+1(i3) 6= s2, we have µ′t+1(i3) ≡ s3 i3
µt+1(i3) = s2 and i3 ∈ I t+1E . Continuing in this fashion, we construct a cycle (i1, i2, ..., in)
such that µ′t+1(i1) = µt+1(i2), µ
′
t+1(i2) = µt+1(i3), ..., µ
′
t+1(in) = µt+1(i1) and µ
′
t+1(h) h
µt+1(h) for all agents in the cycle. Next, from matching µt+1 we implement the cycle and
µ′′t+1 is this new matching in which the rest of teachers keep their position (µ
′′
t+1(a) =
µt+1(a) for all teachers that are not in the cycle). Then, it must be that µ
′′
t+1 does not
adapt to Ot+1, otherwise µ′′t+1 is a matching that adapts to O
t+1 and is Pareto superior
to µt+1. Then, there is a teacher k ∈ I t+1, such that sm ≡ µ′′t+1(im) k µ′′t+1(k) for some
m = 1, ..., n and k Ot+1sm im. Note that k ∈ I t+1E . But since µ′t+1(im) = µ′′t+1(im) and
µ′t+1 adapts to O˜
t, we have two cases: µ′t+1(k) k µ′′t+1(im) k µ′′t+1(k) = µt+1(k) or
µ′t+1(im) = µ
′′
t+1(im) k µ′t+1(k) and im O˜t+1sm k.
In the first case, we have that k has a better position in µ′t+1 than in µt+1, and then
we can construct another cycle. We claim that the second case is not possible. Once
again, we analyze two cases: im >
t+1
sm k and k >
t+1
sm im. If im >
t+1
sm k, as im, k ∈ I t+1E
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and k Ot+1sm im, then νt+1(k) = sm; we claim that: (1) ν
′
t+1(k) 6= sm and (2) k ∈ I tE.
First, observe that if ν ′t+1(k) = sm, we have sm k µ′t+1(k) %k ν ′t+1(k) = sm. We
also know that sm = νt+1(k) = µt(k) = µ
′
t+1(im) %im ν ′t+1(im) = µ′t(im) and then k
Otsm im. But as im >
t
sm k, then it must be k ∈ I tE. Finally we found that: k ∈ I tE
and sm = νt+1(k) = µt(k) 6= ν ′t+1(k) = µ′t(k). But, because of the last lemma, this
a contradiction. A similar argument shows in the second case that ν ′t+1(im) = sm 6=
νt+1(im) and im ∈ I tE, and then we find another contradiction. Finally, as we note
earlier, in the first case we can construct another cycle and repeat the procedure until
we find a matching that adapts to Ot and is Pareto superior to µt; then we have a final
contradiction.
For the next period, we have that µt+1(i1) %i1 µ′t+1(i1) and the same argument applies
to prove that i1 can never benefit in the following periods.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. For the first period, we have problem
〈
S, {qs}i , I t, µt−1,, >ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′
〉
and
another problem 〈 S, {qs}s , I t, µt−1, , >˜ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉, which represents an improvement
for a teacher i1. Let µt denote the matching selected by the teacher proposing deferred
acceptance mechanism in the first problem and µ˜t the one selected in the second problem.
We shall prove that µ˜t(i1) %i1 µt(i1). Suppose that µt(i1) i1 µ˜t(i1) and let µt(i1) ≡ s1.
In the related market of each problem, we know that Ots = O˜
t
s for all s 6= s′, j Ots′ k ⇐⇒ j
O˜ts′ k, if i1 O
t
s′ k then i1 O˜
t
s′ k and if j O˜
t
s′ i1 then j O
t
s′ i1.
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Then, as µ˜t is non-wasteful, we have
∣∣µ˜−1t (s1)∣∣ = qs1 and then, there is a teacher
i2 ∈ I t such that µ˜t(i2) = s1 and µt(i2) 6= s1. Since µ˜t(i2) i1 µ˜t(i1), we know that
i2O˜
t
s1
i1 and then i2 O
t
s1
i1. Therefore, as µt(i1) = s1, then µt(i2) i2 s1 = µ˜t(i2). Let
µt(i2) ≡ s2. We can make the same argument for i2. As µ˜t is non-wasteful, there is a
teacher i3 ∈ I t such that µ˜t(i3) = s2 and µt(i3) 6= s2. Since µ˜t(i3) i2 µ˜t(i2), we know
that i3 O˜
t
s2
i2 and then i3 O
t
s2
i2. Therefore, as µt(i2) = s2, then µt(i3) i3 s2 = µ˜t(i2).
10Here O˜t+1s′ denotes the strict priority order in the related market of all teachers for school s
′ in the
problem with >˜ts′ .
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Continuing in this fashion, we construct a cycle (i1, i2, ..., in) such that µt(i1) = µ˜t(i2),
µt(i2) = µ˜t(i3), ..., µt(in) = µ˜t(i1) and µt(h) h µ˜t(h) for all agents in the cycle. Next,
from matching µ˜t implement the cycle and µ
′
t is this new matching; that is µ
′
t(i) = µt(i)
for all i ∈ {i1, i2, ..., in} and µ′t(i) = µ˜t(i) for all i /∈ {i1, i2, ..., in} . Then, it must be that
µ′t does not adapt to O˜
t; otherwise µ′t is a matching that adapts to O˜
t and is Pareto
superior to µ˜t. Then, there is a teacher j /∈ {i1, i2, ..., in} such that sm ≡ µ′t(im) j µ′t(j)
for some m = 1, ..., n and j O˜tsm im. But since µ
′
t(im) = µt(im) and µt adapts to O
t, we
have two cases: µt(j) j µ′t(im) j µ′t(j) or µt(im) = µ′t(im) j µt(j) and im Otsm j. In
the second case, it must be that sm = s
′ and j = i1, and then we have a contradiction.
Hence, it is the case that µt(j) j µ′t(j) and we can construct another cycle and repeat
the procedure until we find a matching that adapts to O˜t and is Pareto superior to µ˜t;
then we have a final contradiction.
For the second period, denote by M t+1 = 〈 S, {qs}s , I t+1, µt, , >t+1s′ , {>t+1s }s 6=s′〉
and M˜ t+1 = 〈 S, {qs}s , I t+1, µ˜t, , >˜t+1s′ , {>t+1s }s 6=s′〉 the markets of the following period
in the case that we have in period t: 〈S, {qs}i , I t, µt−1, , >ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉 and 〈 S,
{qs}s , I t, µt−1, , >˜ts′ , {>ts}s 6=s′〉, respectively.; µt+1 and µ˜t+1 denote the outcome of the
mechanism in each market in period t + 1. We define the following market at t + 1 :
Mˆ t+1 = 〈 S, {qs}s , I t+1, µt, , >˜t+1s′ , {>t+1s }s 6=s′〉 and µˆt+1 is the matching reached by
the mechanism in this market. We know that ν˜t+1(i1) %i1 νt+1(i1) = νˆt+1(i1).11 Then by
the argument used in strategy-proofness, we have µ˜t+1(i1) %i1 µˆt+1(i1), and by respecting
improvement for one period (the statement just proved), µˆt+1(i1) %i1 µt+1(i1). Finally,
by transitivity, we have µ˜t+1(i1) %i1 µt+1(i1). Repeating the argument for the following
periods, we have µ˜τ (i1) %i1 µτ (i1) for all τ ≥ t.
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